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Struggling over Crisis. Discoursive Positionings  
and Academic Positions in the Field of  
German-Speaking Economists 
Christian Schmidt-Wellenburg ∗ 
Abstract: »Umkämpfte Krise. Diskursive Positionierungen und akademische 
Positionen im Feld deutschsprachiger Volkswirt*innen«. “If you put two econo-
mists in a room, you get two opinions, unless one of them is Lord Keynes, in 
which case you get three opinions.” Following the premise of this quotation 
attributed to Winston Churchill, varying perceptions of the European crisis by 
academic economists and their structural homology to economists’ positions in 
the field of economics are examined. The dataset analysed using specific multi-
ple correspondence analysis (MCA) and hierarchical agglomerative clustering 
(HAC) comprises information on the careers of 480 German-speaking econo-
mists and on statements they made concerning crisis-related issues. It can be 
shown that the main structural differences in the composition and amount of 
scientific and academic capital held by economists as well as their age and de-
gree of transnationalisation are linked to how they see the crisis: as a national 
sovereign debt crisis, as a European banking crisis, or as a crisis of European in-
tegration and institutions. 
Keywords: Economics, multiple correspondence analysis, Bourdieu, field, dis-
course, mixed methods, European Union, crisis. 
1.   Introduction 
When crisis struck in 2008, economists were involved on all fronts at the same 
time. The financial instruments that failed only existed because financial eco-
nomics had become highly mathematised over the years (MacKenzie 2007). 
The people made redundant were experts trained in economics and socialised 
as professionals in business schools and economic departments. And those who 
had deregulated financial markets in the years prior to this had been deeply 
absorbed by a basic set of economic ideas tightly interwoven in the overarching 
neoclassical paradigm: unhampered (particularly financial) markets that create 
optimal results, further the public good and are consequently of general public 
interest. At the same time, political action had to be taken, policies to counter 
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the crisis were needed, and economists’ authoritative expertise was sought by 
those in charge. As a result of this, the crisis did not diminish the importance of 
the profession of economics for modern economies and states alike, although 
some other professions would have loved to have seen that happen. Much to 
the contrary, it turned into a catalytic moment for many developments in the 
field of economists because it gave different factions within economics a 
chance to position themselves anew or for the first time against other academic 
and political agents in order to gain or preserve their influence and their careers 
(Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017). 
The issues that developed as a result of this are related to two interlinked 
questions: determining what the crisis is all about and the role economics has 
and should play as an academic discipline. Economists’ stances on both these 
are backed by their academic authority. Hence, in order to understand the dif-
ferences between varying position-takings, we need to take a closer look at 
these different forms of academic economists’ sources of authority (Schmidt-
Wellenburg 2016). Statements expressed on either of the crises are viewed by 
other economists as made in certain economic discourses and used to locate 
speakers, to understand what certain speakers stand for, and to position them-
selves in relation to them (Angermüller 2013). The magnitude of statements is 
estimated with reference to the speaker’s position in relation to other econo-
mists, drawing on the knowledge of their achievements and career trajectories. 
At the same time, this kind of understanding is only possible because those 
observing and reacting to these statements have the ability to ‘read’ each other, 
always in perspective, due to their own, often long, professional socialisation. 
Throughout their education and subsequently in their professional careers, 
economists are shaped not only by their scientific research and academic teach-
ing but also by their work in consulting and in politics and business. Since 
economic as well as bureaucratic and academic institutions are predominantly 
anchored in nation stateness today, it comes as no surprise that these issues 
play out differently in various national settings (Fourcade 2009). At the same 
time, bureaucratic institutions and markets have been transnationalised – par-
ticularly in Europe (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013) – creating new linkages 
between economists and transnational political and economic agents and insti-
tutions. As a result, economists have also become transnationalised in some 
parts of the academic world, whereas they have remained nationally anchored 
in others. This makes it necessary to take into account not only the European 
dimension when analysing European fields and discourses, but also the national 
anchoring of agents in national fields. The statements and behaviour of econo-
mists can only be understood with reference to their ‘national’ or ‘transnation-
al’ position in national fields, as will be argued here with specific reference to 
the German field of economists. 
If this holds true, an epistemological conclusion has to be drawn and a basic 
research hypothesis can be proposed. In order to explain opposing statements 
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on the economic crisis as well as the crisis of economics, we have to consider 
not only political, bureaucratic, and economic circumstances but also the rela-
tionships between economists as economists. This can be done, on the one 
hand, by reconstructing the field of economists using biographical data and by 
capturing the historical changes it underwent or is currently undergoing. On the 
other hand, the discursive structure underlying the utterances produced by 
economists on crisis-related issues has to be reconstructed and their underlying 
logic needs to be made explicit. Starting from these epistemological premises, 
it becomes possible to formulate the general hypothesis that position-takings on 
either of the crises are interconnected and both differences and similarities 
between the statements can be seen as having structural homologies to the 
positions of the agents expressing them (Lebaron 2000). 
The paper unfolds these arguments using multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA) to analyse a dataset of 480 German economists who positioned them-
selves in one of the most controversial politico-economic disputes on crisis-
related issues fought out in public in Germany in recent years: the European 
Council’s decision in June 2012 to go ahead with forming a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Euro Area 
Summit Statement on June 29, 2012). The announcement of effectively creat-
ing a European banking union was immediately met with resistance and within 
less than a week, an open letter opposing a EU banking union was written1 and 
ultimately signed by 274 “German speaking economists” (Krämer 2012). This 
almost instantaneously triggered a response by another group of economists in 
favour of a European solution to the banking crisis, who issued an open letter 
signed by 221 economists (Burda et al. 2012). Here, we have two strong and 
opposing statements on the question of whether a European banking union 
might be a reasonable solution to a certain dimension of the economic crisis. 
Due to the low threshold for signing at least one of the letters and high numbers 
of signatures it can be inferred that a fair proportion of those interested in this 
subject stood up for their position. Hence, not only those who routinely engage 
in public political discourse but also many academic backbenchers signed, 
allowing us to examine a much broader area of the German-speaking econo-
mists’ discourse on the crisis, including but also going beyond the usual sus-
pects who always engage in public politico-economic disputes (for these see 
Hirte 2013).  
                                                             
1  Initiated by Walter Krämer, Bernd Raffelhüschen, Klaus Zimmermann; Hans-Werner Sinn has 
stated that he did not initiate the letter but was one of the first people to sign it. 
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2. German Economics as an Academic Field 
The space occupied by economists reconstructed here is part of the academic 
world and, as such, all agents in it hold the shared perception that they are 
engaging in scientific practices in order to produce true statements about the 
world. Their work is driven by an interest in disinterestedness, as is the case in 
any field in which symbolic forms are produced (Bourdieu 1998a): The de-
scriptions and explanations of economic phenomena are published as contribu-
tions to the imagined pool of objective knowledge, not as moves in the strug-
gles to improve one’s position, although they always also have this effect. The 
disinterestedness guarantees the autonomy of the academic field and, at the 
same time, the double-faced character of academic practices is an open secret 
known to anyone engaging in science (Bourdieu 2004, 25). This not only leads 
to many practices aimed at upholding disinterestedness but also results in two 
kinds of habitual abilities needed to engage in this practice and two kinds of 
objectified forms of such abilities – scientific and academic capital – that struc-
ture this field.  
Scientific capital is a special form of symbolic capital that depends on the 
general cultural and more specific academic merits that agents have acquired. 
Following Pierre Bourdieu, such symbolic capital is the ability to objectify 
certain aspects of the world, to produce doxical categories and worldviews used 
throughout society as basic and natural ontologies (Bourdieu 1989). Symbolic 
capital materialises in publications and statistics which in turn indicate a scien-
tist’s reputation to his or her peers. This is at the heart of his or her ability to 
continue to produce scientific statements. This makes publications a form of 
scientific capital in two ways: each publication notes the historically objectified 
type of value prized at that very moment and becomes a sought-after resource 
for future engagement (Bourdieu 2004, 55). Hence, scientists struggle not only 
to produce these statements but also to influence how such statements should 
be legitimately made. At the same time, publications have a wide societal im-
pact and contribute to symbolic domination beyond the academic field: they 
inform legitimate descriptions of the world, state what the facts are, what has to 
be done and who can do what. 
Academic capital consists of academic merits in the form of qualifications 
obtained, the organisational influence and manpower one commands due to 
one’s position in academic institutions such as universities, research institutes 
or academies, or in certain departments of these, and the financial resources 
one is able to thus mobilise. Here, the links with other forms of capital and 
hence other fields becomes apparent, particularly politics and the economy 
(Bourdieu 1998b, 36). In general, economic capital transfers into academic 
capital in the form of university and research funding, whereas political capital 
transfers into academic capital by deeming certain disciplines to be researching 
subjects of general public interest or directly contributing to the common good, 
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which will again translate into funding. All positions in the academic field 
integrate scientific as well as academic capital and agents constantly engage in 
practices that transfer one into the other. The type of statements and the sym-
bolic capital making them possible are the stakes fought over and, at the same 
time, statements translate into political influence, income, social prestige, and 
social structural position. Practising science is a constant quest for knowledge 
and, at the same time, it is a struggle over legitimate forms of cognition and 
one’s place in the social space.  
Economists distinguish themselves from other disciplines through the theo-
retical assumptions and methods they use to produce true statements about 
economic phenomena other disciplines cannot produce. They share a mind-set 
that they have incorporated through their scientific socialisation in the PhD 
phase, a not only reflexive but in many ways tacit knowledge that allows them 
to produce economic research questions, utilise mathematical techniques in 
order to analyse data so as to reach economists’ conclusions (Lenger 2018). 
Their work is structured by specific publications such as journal articles, or 
institutions such as research institutes and academic societies, departments and 
curricula that publicly accredit economists and economic thought and engage in 
a constant process of objectification. Being a member of this tribe not only 
means being able to engage in the tribe’s practice but, at the same time, being 
able to show the legitimate, objectified symbolic tokens associated with mem-
bership. It is those tokens that can be used to trace the differences between 
different economists (Lebaron 2000): educational certificates including a hier-
archy of institutions awarding these, publications including a hierarchy of types 
of publishing and outlets, membership of academic circles and associations and 
working for or consulting with political and economic agencies. All the differ-
ent tokens can be used to envisage relationships of power as well as of meaning 
between economists, making it possible to trace the forms and distributions of 
scientific and academic capital in this specific disciplinary space.  
Since World War II, German economics has become more and more inter-
nationalised. What was once “Nationalökonomie,” a science closely associated 
with the nation state and focused on understanding the economy as a national-
bound system, became linked to the US field of economists when the US gov-
ernment and various philanthropic organisations such as the Ford Foundation 
became involved in rebuilding German academia (Hesse 2012). Exchanges of 
lecturers, researchers, and students with the US were academic merits in their 
own right. Over time, together with US PhDs, these changed from being some-
thing extraordinary into common career opportunities, very often opening up 
opportunities for top German economists to pursue a career in the US. From the 
1990s onwards, German PhD education was reinvented along the US paradigm 
of graduate schools, departments were restructured by denominating chairs 
along the trinity of mic-mac-metrics (micro-economics, macro-economics, and 
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econometrics) with assorted applied specialisations, and teaching today follows 
the global textbook canon (Colander 2008; Pahl 2011; Maesse 2015).  
The potential for transnationalisation is linked to the universal languages of 
English and mathematics, modelling and statistics in economics. In addition, 
the focus of economics as a universal science attending to an anthropologically 
universal phenomenon – market exchange – and presenting general solutions 
for how to further and govern markets, frees academic economics from much 
of its historical rooting in the development of specific nation states (Fourcade 
2006). As a result, some areas of German economics became sucked into the 
transnational academic field of economists that is dominated by US-based 
academic institutions and international organisations. It is important not to 
forget, however, that this does not mean that all German academic economists 
hold a Chicago or Harvard PhD and publish in the American Economic Re-
view. As Marion Fourcade (2009) has shown for the US, the UK, and France, 
the national pathways and institutional characteristics prevail to this day, but in 
each one of the national contexts transnational linkages have developed in 
certain areas.  
From this setting, we can derive the main hypothesis to be examined here: 
the politico-economic statements on the European crisis are linked to the posi-
tions held by economists in the field of economists, a field structured by its 
links to state-bureaucratic fields and greatly affected by inter- and transnation-
alisation in recent decades. Those who have profited from internationalisation 
and have been involved in recent years in researching transnational and Euro-
pean phenomena are those who tend to be in favour of transnational crisis 
solutions and to opt for a European Banking Union. Those who opt for national 
solutions to the banking crisis, conversely, are those who have not profited 
from internationalisation because their careers are inextricably linked to the 
older and more nationally anchored areas of the field more closely associated 
with classic ordoliberal positions aimed at the nation state. Practice theory is at 
the base of the argument: the practical sense inherent to agents lets them en-
gage in practices and produce behaviour with “family resemblances” (Wittgen-
stein 1980, §67) even across different social settings, ranging from research 
projects and publishing to engagement in politico-economic discourse, for 
example, on the European crisis. Hence, the task is to reconstruct the practical 
sense by showing the family resemblances and uncovering the main structural 
dimensions of the space occupied by economists underlying them.  
3. Collecting Information on Careers and Discursive 
Statements 
Indicators for the amount and composition of capital held by the 480 econo-
mists observed in the study were mainly collected from their curricula vitae 
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(CVs). Writing a CV enables academics to objectify their positions using 
standard means of evaluating their achievements and closely associated legiti-
mate ambitions that make up their careers. At the same time, CVs are used in 
the field of economists, among others, to measure the worth of academic 
agents, to compare this and to judge their potential. Standard evaluative prac-
tices involving CVs are acts of hiring, applying for and obtaining research 
funds, as well as awarding grants and prizes. CVs function as a form of synop-
sis of all different types of practices that are highly objectified, legitimated, and 
worthy; in other words, the forms of capital in the field that empower those 
who hold them and position them in relation to others. Moreover, a CV lays 
open the standards of valuation used by the person writing it. As a result, dif-
ferences between CVs become very important and should not be glossed over, 
particularly since the economists observed in the present study differ greatly by 
research area and academic age, measured by the year they obtained their PhD, 
with this ranging from 1951 to 2013. Changes and differences in the field of 
economists can be traced in the CVs, if the different forms of CVs are taken 
seriously and are not aligned to one ideal model.   
In addition to the CVs, alternative sources of information accessible online 
were used to gather information on categories that were included in some CVs 
but not all: membership lists of organizations and institutions, Kürschners 
Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender Online and Deutsches Hochschullehrerver-
zeichnis (both online databases on German-speaking academics), Munzinger 
Online (biographical database of German speakers), GEPRIS (German Project 
Information System, a database on academic research funding in Germany), 
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek (the German National Library), www.econbiz.de 
(database on publications in economic sciences) and the Social Science Cita-
tion Index (SSCI). Information from CVs and other sources was taken into 
account for up until the end of 2013, since many of the economists’ characteris-
tics of summer 2012 take some time to be documented in the sources used.   
The categories used to form the active and passive variables in the specific 
MCA were constructed from the CVs using Grounded Theory Methodology 
(GTM). Here, hermeneutic interpretation structured by reflexive steps of open 
coding, contrasting codes, and recoding is used to unearth the main meaning 
structures behind a certain class of social phenomena (Corbin and Strauss 
2008). GTM  and field analysis when seen in a practice theoretical framework 
share the basic methodological concept of creating knowledge by breaking with 
presuppositions, by reconstructing categories using the idea of maximal or 
minimal differences between observations in order to detect communalities or 
differences between them, by reconstructing rules as observed sense and at-
tempting to refine or redesign these by taking on more and different material, 
trying to adjust scientific statements and observed behaviour in a fitting process 
(Diaz-Bone 2007; Kelle 1994; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2018). The qualitative 
research software Maxqda was used to keep a systematic track record of the 
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process and to ensure that the relationship between initial observation and 
property category developed is preserved.  
In the MCA, 20 active variables with 78 active modalities were used [see 
Table 2].2 They fall into four broad classes that are important throughout the 
historical period of all careers observed: academic merits (country of PhD, 
Habilitation,3 scientific award, current position, head of research institute), 
scientific practices (average rank of journal article according to the Handelsblatt-
Ranking, main area of research by JEL classification, type of academic publish-
ing), academic memberships (affiliation with German and non-German re-
search institutes and think tanks, current university, other academic member-
ships), and scientific funding or generating income by consulting or working in 
politics or business (member of the Sachverständigenrat,4 type of funding, 
consulting or working in business or politics, political awards).  
In addition, one of two groups of passive variables is used on the one hand 
to characterise the structure of the field in more detail. It includes age measured 
by year of PhD, number of research projects and number of engagements with 
political and government institutions. On the other hand, this group also con-
tains some first variables that describe the engagement of economists in either 
politico-economic struggles or in struggles over the future of economics itself: 
signing letters for and/or against EU banking union, signing the Hamburger 
Appell, party membership and affiliations with parties and party foundations, 
engagement with heterodox positions in economics, signing the letter “Rettet 
die Wirtschaftspolitik an den Universitäten” (Save economic policy at German 
universities) or the letter “Baut die deutsche Volkswirtschaft nach internatio-
nalen Standards um” (Restructuring German economics according to interna-
tional standards) (yes/no) and writing for ÖkonomenBlog and/or Wirtschaft-
liche Freiheit (yes/no) or VoxEU and/or Ökonomenstimmen. 
Since signing letters is a rather crude way of distinguishing between differ-
ent forms of discursive positioning, a second group of passive variables was 
used that allows us to describe in more detail the statements produced in the 
collected utterances on crisis-related issues produced by the economists. The 
main aim is to unearth the underlying structures that make statements intelligi-
ble to others and discern different standpoints on a certain subject from other 
standpoints on the same subject. The practical sense inherent in producing 
statements has to be objectified and reconstructed as discursive structure (Fou-
cault 2002). In order to do this, texts that focus on European aspects of the 
crisis revolving around the subjects of banking regulation and supervision, the 
European monetary system, European institutions, and European member 
                                                             
2  For a detailed account of all active variables and modalities, see the Appendix. 
3  A postdoctoral qualification traditionally required to become an associated or full professor 
in German-speaking academic contexts. 
4  Council of economic advisors to German federal government.  
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states’ sovereign debt were collected for 320 of the 480 individuals researched. 
These include blog entries, newspaper articles, and interviews as well as inter-
views broadcasted on radio, video material available online and articles in 
academic journals and books. Out of these 320 individuals, 49.1 percent signed 
for and 48.1 percent against the EU banking union.  
The material collected includes numerous statements that others also engag-
ing in the discourse identify as adequate contributions to discussing issues of 
crisis, as the various cross-references made in the material show. At the same 
time, the concepts of what is actually in crisis, what should be done and who 
should become active or change their behaviour is not clarified once and for all 
but constituted in the ongoing discursive practice (Keller 2011). Hence, when 
attempting to understand and reconstruct the different meanings inherent in a 
certain discourse, we find these not only scattered across texts but often inter-
linked to other discourses. Statements always have various meanings that be-
come manifest in their interlinkages to other statements. Consequently, it be-
comes necessary to deconstruct text and utterances in order to reconstruct the 
fragments of meaning that, when interlinked in the context not of the text but of 
a certain discourse, make up not only statements but position-takings in this 
discourse, and become linked and attributed to certain speakers (Diaz-Bone 
2005; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2018).  
From the texts collected, 177 binary variables were constructed using the 
same GTM mentioned above.5 These passive variables describe four aspects 
always required in discursive practices in order to constitute something as a 
social phenomenon (Keller 2013; Mannheim 1960). Firstly, it needs to be 
framed as problem (42 variables) and one worth engaging with in order to 
improve the situation. This often involves depicting reasons why something has 
changed for the better or worse and may imply responsibilities either for creat-
ing the problem or for solving it. Secondly, denoting something as a problem 
immediately implies looking for as solution (57 variables). The solutions pro-
posed call for action to be taken to overcome problems and again entail subjec-
tive and causal attributions such as who has to endure hardship or who should 
profit from the action taken. Different problems connected with varying solu-
tions than constitute what is an economic issue as well as what economic, pri-
vate, and state agents are. Thirdly, the process of problematizing involves overt 
or covert judgements referring to values (27 variables) that are constantly made 
when hierarchising problems, evaluating solutions or openly naming goals seen 
as desirable to be achieved. Hence, different scales are invoked or at least im-
plied in order to mark what is not only of interest but in need of attention 
(Boltanski und Thévenot 1999). Finally, discursive practice always implies 
adversaries (15 variables), often named, who either stand in the way of problem 
                                                             
5  See the Appendix for all of these passive variables describing problems, solutions, adver-
saries, and values used to create statements on the crisis. 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  156 
resolution or, more frequently, can be seen as competing practical forms of 
problematizing. Using these four angles, the texts can be deconstructed, the 
underlying web of relations can be reconstructed in which the European eco-
nomic crisis becomes a problem that economists want to and have to engage 
with, albeit in different ways, as this analysis will show.  
4. Constructing the Space of German Economists 
After analysing the material and constructing the variables, a specific MCA 
(taken from SPAD 8.2) was used to reconstruct the space of properties and 
individuals because it allows us to set certain categories of active variables as 
passive, which is very useful for preventing overrepresentation of some charac-
teristics of individuals that are described by more than one modality. In addi-
tion, the individuals were weighted according to their stance towards the Euro-
pean banking union, since both camps were not equally present in the data set 
and this would have distorted the space towards the preferences of the larger 
group. Retaining the space constructed by the MCA hierarchical agglomerative 
clustering was used to partition the cloud of individuals into sub-clouds that 
could be linked to certain discursive currents in the space (Le Roux and 
Rouanet 2004, 106).  
Table 1: Variance Rates (Eigenvalue λ), Variance Rates Cumulated and 
Cumulated Modified of Axis 1 to 10 
Axes Eigenvalue (λ) Variance rates cumulated %
Cumulated 
modified %
1 0.210 7.22 53.44
2 0.141 12.06 70.93
3 0.106 15.70 77.66
4 0.096 19.01 82.34 
5 0.092 22.19 86.33
6 0.084 25.08 88.93
7 0.082 27.90 91.24
8 0.077 30.55 92.92
9 0.076 33.15 94.44 
10 0.074 35.70 95.78
 
The first three axes capture 77.66 percent of the overall variance when corrected 
using the Benzécri’s method (Le Roux and Rouanet 2004, 200-1, 209).6 Here, I 
will focus on the first (53.55 percent) and second axes (17.49 percent) in detail 
                                                             
6  To calculate the correction using Benzécri for a specific MCA using SPAD 8.2, see the Excel 
macro accessible at <www.cevipof.com/fr/l-equipe/l-equipe-administrative/bdd/equipe/43> 
(Accessed June 6, 2018) written by Flora Chanvril. 
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and will only briefly mention the third axis (6.72 percent), since it only has an 
indirect relationship to the position-takings of economists on the issue of the 
European crisis. As can be seen when we look at the contribution of the four 
different groups of variables presented in Table 2, their total contributions only 
differ slightly, allowing for each one of them to have the same potential effect 
on the overall variance of the data. This changes when we look at their contri-
butions to each of the axes. Research funding and links with politics and busi-
ness or academic merits do not play a major role on the first axis, which is 
dominated by the different practices scientists engage in when working in their 
field and the academic memberships they hold. In contrast, scientific practices 
become much less important for the second axis as the contribution by varia-
bles that depict academic merits and research funding and, in particular, con-
nections to state-bureaucracies increase.  
Table 2:  Numbers of Variables and Modalities by Group and Group 
Contributions to Total Variance and Variance of Axes 1 to 3 
 N Contribution in percent 
Variables Modalities Total Axis 1 Axis 2 Axis 3 
Academic merits 5 18 22.41 19.22 26.35 24.65 
Scientific practices 3 177 24.14 31.57 19.67 24.13 
Academic  
memberships 7 22 25.86 32.90 31.09 18.24 
Research funding/ 
consulting and earning 5 21 27.59 16.32 22.90 32.98 
 
For a more detailed interpretation of the space, we have to make sense of the 
main structural dimensions that organise the data in a first step by examining 
the modalities of variables that make a major contribution to the orientation of 
the axis (Le Roux and Rouanet 1998, 2004, 217-8) and in a second step by 
creating a theoretical argument that attempts to spell out the logic that links 
these properties together (Duval 2013, 115-6). Both steps are shown in Graph 1 
using the 33 modalities that contribute more than 2.0 percent to at least one of 
the axes weighted by the percentage of individuals associated with the modality 
and, in grey, the results of interpreting the axis and areas of space.  
                                                             
7  This group of variables includes two variables with one non-active modality each.  
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Graph 1: Cloud of Modalities in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2 (Size of Modalities 
According to Frequency) 
 
4.1   Interpretation of Axis 1 
The first axis can be interpreted as depicting the volume of capital and hence 
power in this space of economists. It constitutes a hierarchy of positions with 
lower, less well-equipped positions to the right and higher, better equipped 
positions to the left. All variables that have considerable impact on the axis 
describe academic practices and achievements that create hierarchies. Eight 
variables account for approximately three quarters of the axis orientation on, 
and are all linked to, scientific and academic practices such as the average 
journal ranking, current university affiliation, type of funding, affiliation with 
research institutes, form of academic engagement, type of PhD, and area of 
academic work. Engagement with governmental institutions as well as with the 
world of business is not included since these are variables that describe gains in 
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the wider academic bureaucracy of learned institutions, academies and scien-
tific self-governance. For a more detailed interpretation, I will take a closer 
look at those 17 modalities that contribute between 2.0 percent and 7.5 percent 
each to the axis and fall into two large groups, situated on both sides of the first 
axis running from right to left.   
Table 3:  17 Modalities That Contribute Most to the First Axis (between 2.1 
Percent and 7.3 Percent) 
 Variable 
(number of 
modalities) 
Contribution 
of variable 
in % to axis 1 
Label of 
modality 
Contribution of 
modality in % to 
axis 1 
Left Right 
Academic 
merits 
PhD (7) 8.9 PhD_US 4.0  
scientific awards 
(3) 5.8 Sci_Award>2 3.7  
current academic 
position (4) 3.9 emeritus  2.1 
Academic 
memberships 
current university 
(6) 10.2 
Uni_UsUkAus 2.2  
Uni_HBrank 2.3  
Uni_Gapplsci  2.4 
Scientific 
practices 
avgHBjrank (5) 14.5 
avgHBjrank_no  4.5 
++ 7.3  
pubtype (5) 9.2 
monograph  2.9 
journal 5.1  
JEL (7) 7.9 Jel_GecoMFiSt  3.6 
Academic 
memberships 
German research 
institute (6) 8.4 
Inst_none  2.6 
GInst_CesIzaZew 3.1  
non-German 
research institute 
(2) 
9.4 nGInst_all 7.5  
Research 
funding / 
consulting 
and earning 
type of funding 
(5) 9.5 
no_funding  3.5 
Fund_nGallBank
Ncb 5.0  
consulting and  
earning 
government 
institutions (5) 
5.2 
GovConsult_Ncb
Ecb 
Imf 
2.3  
Total  92.9  42,5 21,6 
 
Modalities that describe a low overall volume of capital, for instance, not hav-
ing obtained funding (3.5 percent), never having being affiliated with a re-
search institute (2.6 percent), and never having published an article in a journal 
that is ranked in the Handelsblatt-Ranking (4.5 percent) are located to the right. 
Individuals situated here put their academic efforts into publishing monographs 
(2.9 percent) and engage in the areas of general economics and economic edu-
cation, in management and financial sciences as well as statistics (3.6 percent). 
Those with a profile like this are most certainly not at the forefront of scientific 
progress as understood by the majority of economists in the field. Two other 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  160 
categories suggest why this could be the case: being an emeritus (2.1 percent) and 
being employed by a university of applied sciences (2.4 percent), which means 
much more teaching and often working in business or closely with businesses.  
On the left-hand side, we see those who publish in journals ranked in the 
highest quartile of the Handelsblatt journal ranking (7.3 percent), the other 
quartiles not contributing as much to the first axis, but nicely ordered from high 
to low along it. High-end journals such as American Economic Review, Econ-
ometrica, or The Journal of Finance are all in English, mostly US based and 
seen as the main outlets of current high-profile economic research, whereas 
non-US-based or even non-English-language journals rank in the lowest quar-
tile. Publishing mainly in high ranking journals goes hand in hand with focus-
ing academic production on publishing journal articles (5.1 percent). Econo-
mists located here have affiliations to non-German research institutes 
(7.5 percent) such as the US National Bureau of Economic Research and special 
German research institutes (3.1 percent) such as the CES-Ifo Institute in Mu-
nich, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) in Bonn and the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim, all of which are internationally 
renowned for their scientific reputation and not for a certain ideological imprint. 
Working for or consulting national central banks, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2.3 percent) can also 
be seen here, which comes as no surprise since these institutions are among the 
biggest economic research hubs and departments worldwide (Mudge and 
Vauchez 2016). This goes hand in hand with acquiring funding from non-
German research institutions, national central banks, and other banks 
(5.0 percent). The career paths of economists located here often include a PhD 
from a US university (4.0 percent) as well as being employed by a US, UK, or 
Australian university (2.2 percent) or at a German economics department 
ranked in the top 27 departments by the 2011 Handelsblatt ranking 
(2.3 percent), all further increasing their capital volume. The fact that the prop-
erty of having received more than two scientific awards (3.7 percent) also can 
be seen here along with the highest amount of capital relevant in this space of 
economists seems natural but it is at the same time the highest form of symbolic 
recognition and shows how this space works as a scientific universe: all the 
other forms of capital mentioned above, the struggles to obtain them and the 
positioning of those who do not fare well in these games to the right of the axis 
are forgotten when scientific genius is marked and put on display by bestowing 
some with many prizes (Lebaron 2006).  
The capital volume interpretation is supported by the location of the passive 
categories that depict the amount of funding acquired: when connected in rank 
order, the line runs along the first axis starting with no funding on the right and 
ending with more than six projects on the left. Funding of projects is important 
in this space, since it is a basic requirement for employing people to work on 
one’s own research agenda and enables them and oneself to produce publica-
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tions and thereby gain a good reputation. At the same time, obtaining funding 
in itself discloses to the community the economist’s ability to produce im-
portant research; this then becomes a basis for accumulating further funding 
and a catalyst for transforming scientific into academic capital and vice versa. 
Positioned right in the middle, it shows quite nicely who has acquired more or 
less capital applicable in this universe and how the different forms acquired are 
transformed into one another through research projects.  
4.2  Interpretation of Axis 2 
The second axis distinguishes the practices and accompanying properties con-
nected to academic, educational, and state bureaucratic institutions on the one 
hand from those that are more focused on research and the purely scientific 
universe. The heteronomous pole of the space is located at the top, whereas the 
autonomous pole of the space is at the bottom. Eight out of 20 active variables 
account for approximately three quarters of the axis inertia. They all have a link 
to national institutions such as scientific academies and learned societies or 
institutions of academic self-governance as well as to consulting or work for 
government institutions. Other variables are explicitly connoted as scientific 
such as the ranking of the journals published in. This dimension can be illus-
trated by 16 properties that contribute the most to the second axis, ranging 
between 2.1 percent and 6.1 percent each. 
Prestigious academic positions can be found at the top, often seen as be-
stowing whoever holds them with high academic honours and, at the same 
time, the opportunity to continuously exert power in this space and on the set-
up of this space. These include membership in the German Research Founda-
tion, the German Council of Science and Humanities (WR) or the German 
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) (6.1 percent), or membership of a non-
German research council, academy or learned society (5.5 percent), or affilia-
tion to a German philanthropic foundation mostly with a business background 
(5.1 percent). These are all institutions deeply anchored in the nation state 
context and responsible for directing funding, setting research agendas and 
structuring the allocation of academic capital. In addition, a Habilitation (4.6 
percent) indirectly links up with national state bureaucracies. Even more direct-
ly linked to national bureaucracies are those working in consulting or for local, 
regional, or national government institutions or parliament (2.2 percent), the 
German government as a member of the Sachverständigenrat (3.4 percent), 
non-German governments or the European Commission or the European Par-
liament (3.5 percent), or international governance institutions aimed at direct 
political intervention such as the United Nations, the Organisation for Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), and the World Bank (2.1 percent). Being given 
political awards (2.3 percent), such as the Bundesverdienstkreuz (the Order of 
Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany), and having worked for or being 
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affiliated to an ordoliberal or neoliberal institute or think tank (2.3 percent) 
such as the Walter Eucken Institute, the Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirt-
schaft, or the Mont Pélerin Society can be seen as stemming from an engage-
ment overlapping with the field of politics. 
Table 4:  16 Modalities That Contribute Most to Second Axis (between 2.1 
Percent and 6.1Percent Each) 
 Variable (number 
of modalities) 
Contribution 
of variable 
in % to axis 2 
Label of 
modality 
Contribution of 
modality in % to 
axis 2 
Bottom Top 
Academic 
merits 
habil (2) 10.7 
Habil  4.6 
habil_no 6.1  
current academic  
position (4) 6.6 JrProf 3.8  
Scientific 
practices 
avgHBjrank (5) 9.6 ++ 3.4  
pubtype (5) 5.9 Journal 2.3  
Academic 
member-
ships 
DfgWrat (2) 7.2 DfGWratDaad  6.1 
German research 
institutes (6) 8.4 GInst_neolib  2.3 
nGRcAcad (2) 6.2 nGRcAcad  5.5 
current university 
(6) 5.6 Uni_UsUkAus 3.3  
Research 
funding/ 
consulting 
and earning 
GFoundation (2) 5.5 GFoundation  5.1 
consulting and 
working for 
government 
institutions (5) 
12.3 
GGov_all  2.2 
nGGovEU  3.5 
GovConsult_no  2.6 
UnoOecdWb  2.1 
Sachverständigen-
rat (2) 3.5 
Sachverständig
enrat  3.4 
political awards 
(2) 2.4 pol_award  2.3 
Total  83.9  18.9 39.7 
 
The economists located at the bottom are distinguished from the ones closely 
linked to state institutions at the top by not having acquired a Habilitation 
(6.1 percent) and currently holding or having held a junior professorship 
(3.8 percent). Again, these are the ones who also tend to publish in the top 
journals (3.4 percent) and concentrate on publishing journal articles (2.3 per-
cent). They are located at the autonomous pole and hence are also characterised 
by not consulting or having worked for any government institutions (2.6 per-
cent). At the same time, the dimension is characterised by currently working at 
a US, UK, or Australian university (3.3 percent), most of the universities in 
question being at the centre of internationalised economics.  
The main characteristic of the second axis can also be illustrated by plotting 
the number of consulting or job engagements with government institutions, one 
of the supplementary variables not used to construct the space itself. It runs 
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from the lower right quadrant to the upper left quadrant and nicely illustrates 
how the importance of bureaucratic capital stemming from or linked to political 
institutions increases as a source of power in the academic context. The third 
axis will only be touched upon. It is again constructed by opposing scientific 
autonomy and academic heteronomy, although heteronomy is this time created 
by an overlap with the business world. Interestingly enough, this axis does not 
correspond to either a positive or negative stance towards the European banking 
union as a solution to the politico-economic crisis, and since it only accounts 
for 6.72 percent of the total variance, it will not be examined any further.  
Overall, the first axis can be interpreted as distinguishing positions by the 
overall amount of capital potent in this space. The second axis then distin-
guishes between academic capital built on positions in academic and, in the 
wider sense, state-bureaucratic institutions, and scientific capital as a reputation 
built on publishing research results acknowledged as new and well-founded. As 
is the case with many analyses that focus on hierarchies and diversity of certain 
social areas, the diversity documented at the higher end seems to be greater than 
at the lower end. This is not due to ignorance, but is in itself a symptom of the 
prevailing domination: it is created by observing practices such as CVs that are 
drenched with symbolic power and function as important instruments of symbolic 
violence. Bearing this in mind, we can use the attributes that objectify the dif-
ferent forms and amounts of capital in certain areas of this space to understand 
the basic differences and communalities between economists located within it.  
The space is structured by transnationalisation increasing from top right to 
bottom left and opposing nationally anchored economists to those with transna-
tional linkages. These transnational linkages are accompanied by an increase in 
autonomy to follow the latest research programmes and to detach oneself from 
producing practically applicable governmental insights, ideal typically located 
at the other side of the space with the Sachverständigenrat. It is important to 
bear in mind that economists with transnational linkages do not need to be 
firmly rooted in other nationally anchored fields, for example, the US or French 
field of economists, which are structured along the same logics (Lebaron 2001, 
103) but would in other similar contexts most probably also be located at the 
transnational fringes. The transnationalisation of this space is also a genera-
tional phenomenon, as can be ascertained by the passive PhD cohorts [see 
Graph 2]: younger generations without a Habilitation and holding junior pro-
fessorships benefit from changed rules of the game that go hand in hand with 
the internationalisation of the discipline, whereas older generations – emeriti 
with Habilitation qualifications – might lose out as change sweeps through the 
space and pushes them into the top right-hand corner.  
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4.3 Statements on European Banking Union and the Future of 
Economics 
Having signed for the EU banking union (pro) is located in the bottom left 
quadrant, directly opposite having signed the letter against (contra), with those 
having signed both letters closer to the barycentre. All three properties are 
arranged along the descending years of PhD thesis [see Graph 2] and the ascend-
ing rank of journals in which articles are published [see Graph 1], making the 
process of the transnationalisation of the space of economists the main indica-
tor for understanding these position-takings in the politico-economic discourse. 
Graph 2:  Cloud of Modalities in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2, Year of PhD and 
Politic-Economic Affiliations 
 
Towards the bottom left we have economists who have built their careers on 
engaging with international institutions governing an internationalised econo-
my as well as with international research institutes and universities, coming 
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from generations of economists who did not confine their research to national 
economies and institutions. At the top right we have older economists, mostly 
past the peak of their careers, who research national economies, engage with 
national political institutions, and produce as well as continue to apply insights 
into how to govern these on the national, regional, and local level. This is also 
evident from their engagement with political parties ranging from neoliberal 
and nationalist populist movements to all the established parties, and it shows 
in their work for party foundations. Engagement for the first wave of neoliberal 
restructuring of Germany, illustrated here by signing the Hamburger Appell in 
2005, is also located in this area. It follows the national logic anchored in this 
region of space, since it was directed at national policies to reduce regulation, 
the cost of labour, state exposure and involvement in order to increase produc-
tivity. Nation states are seen as economically competitive units. The logic 
behind it portrayed the EU as a competitive arena in which the current state of 
struggles was objectified by EU or OECD rankings and the underlying impera-
tive was to ‘do better than the other nations’ in order not to fall behind and 
become last in line: “Die rote Laterne [red tail light]” (Sinn 2003). When tak-
ing into account that writing in a blog involves more than signing letters and 
that a higher position transfers better into symbolic capital, which can be used 
to do just that, the location of writing for one of the neoliberal blogs at the top 
or writing for one of the pro-European blogs in the bottom left quadrant – both 
left of the barycentre – becomes apparent.  
The stance taken towards the future of economics corresponds well with the 
position-takings on the European banking union. Having signed “Rettet die 
Wirtschaftspolitik an den Universitäten” (Save economic policy at German 
universities) is located in the top right quadrant, “Baut die deutsche Volks-
wirtschaft nach internationalen Standards um” (Restructure German econom-
ics according to international standards) in the bottom left quadrant. These 
differences can also be understood by reference to economists’ careers in either 
internationalised economics or nationally anchored ordoliberalism.  
That economists located in the bottom right quadrant are not engaged much 
in these debates seems obvious for two reasons. They are either located at the 
fringes of economics as a university discipline, publish very little or not at all, 
or work at a university for applied sciences, or they come from or are closely 
associated with other disciplines. It is at this point in space that the properties 
of engaging in the movement for “real-world economics” and “Plurale 
Ökonomie” are located; heretics who would like to change much more than just 
replacing an older orthodoxy with a new international one (cf. Davis 2008).  
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5. Grounding the German Economists’ Discourse on the 
European Crisis in the Space 
The interpretation of the space of economists as the opposition of national 
anchorage and transnational linkage can also be used as a backdrop to under-
stand the more specific discourse positioning of the economists produced by 
drawing on the fragments of meaning reconstructed in the following section. 
The passive modalities describing discursive aspects picture these in relation to 
the active modalities but do not contribute to the construction of the space [see 
Graphs 3 to 6]. When these are compared to the other modalities shown in 
Graph 2, it can be observed that they are mainly concentrated closer to the 
barycentre. Firstly, this is due to focusing on different discursive aspects that 
are then used to construct statements, i.e., they are used in different contexts 
and contribute to different aspect structures. Secondly, it suggests the relative 
autonomy of the politico-economic discourse under research in relation to the 
field of economists.  
5.1  Problems 
Along the first axis, problems vary according to their scope. On the right-hand 
side, most of the problems are associated with national settings whereas on the 
left-hand side problems occur in transnational contexts. The second axis differen-
tiates between two main sources that trigger problems. At the top, problems occur 
because of individual misconduct, while at the bottom problems stem from 
interaction effects and are mostly unintentional. Hence, the problems addressed 
are not abstract (such as water pollution in general) but always relate to a cer-
tain context, agents, and agency. When plotting the problems identified in the 
utterances as passive properties in the reconstructed space, it becomes obvious 
that they are not randomly distributed. Certain areas in the space of economics 
have an affinity to certain problems (and, consequently, solutions, values, and 
adversaries as will be shown later on) that can be distilled into three overarch-
ing problem areas: sovereign debt crisis, banking crisis, and systemic crisis. 
The following discussion is aimed at clarifying and interpreting these clusters.  
In the first quadrant, the crisis is seen as a southern European sovereign debt 
crisis. In the texts, Spain, Italy and, in particular, Greece are in the limelight, 
and, to a much lesser extent, Ireland and France. The EMU is framed as flawed 
right from the outset. Both the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Stability and 
Growth Pact of 1998 are perceived as wanting and luring southern European 
nation states into more public debt. Linking the diverse European economies 
with one currency has created massive current account imbalances in Europe, 
with the deficits of the south seen as a much greater problem than those of the 
north. In addition to the Maastricht Treaty, the problem also lies with politi-
cians in general, who are seen as only serving themselves or the interests of 
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lobbying groups. In the case of politicians from southern Europe, this is some-
times connected with the idea that a certain cultural laziness causes a penchant 
for debt, located to the right on the first axis and high on the second axis. The 
same personalisation shapes the perception of financial services as a problem 
of speculation. These ways of problematising cause a tendency to identify low 
interest rates imposed by the ECB and different EU rescue packages leading up 
to and including the ESM as hopeless efforts at state intervention. The south is 
not implementing the required reforms and the EU does not have adequate 
means to make them do so. Crisis politics consequently becomes a danger to 
(northern) citizens’ and tax payers’ wealth: they will have to pay ultimately. 
The media’s tendency to vilify these countries, combined with the perception 
of there being no alternative to the euro make matters even worse.  
Graph 3:  Cloud of Modalities in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2, Discursive 
Modalities: Problems 
 
Those located in the second quadrant share the tendencies towards problematis-
ing when it comes to EU institutions’ reactions to the crisis. Outright monetary 
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transactions (OMT) by the ECB are seen as dangerous as is its policy of loose 
money, although the main problem at European level is thought to be the pos-
sible disintegration of the EMU and the ongoing conflicts between European 
member states. Fiscal policies followed by southern member states, their lack 
of competitiveness – which is solely attributed to them – as well as fiscal policy 
and sovereign debt in general are all seen as significant. This also implies an 
overall economic downturn in addition to structural problems. On a more gen-
eral scale, the fear of inequality, precarious labour conditions, and private debt 
as well as social unrest can be seen here. Viewed from this perspective, austeri-
ty itself seems to become problematic. Besides problems linked to states and 
wider society, the financial industry and banks are a central focus. Still close to 
the first quadrant is the perception that banks might have become too big to fail 
and so bailout costs are soaring. This is attributed to poor corporate governance 
of banks, including remuneration schemes connected to how banks fare in 
capital markets, and inadequate, low or no banking regulation and supervision, 
leading to solvency problems for banks. Recapitalisation or even socialisation 
then tend to have effects on the sovereign debt situation, burdening the link 
between banks and states. Positioned closer to the third quadrant is the prob-
lematising of the structure of the banking sector which links back to the theme 
of too big to fail. Close to the centroid, the commonly shared assertion can be 
found that there is not sufficient economic expertise to deal with these prob-
lems adequately. 
The focus on banks shifts to systemic risk when we look at the third quad-
rant. Accordingly, too much banking regulation on a microprudential level is 
seen not as a solution but as part of the problem. Along the same line of 
thought, eurobonds have moved from being solutions to problems, since they 
distort information and do not really address the central issues. The crisis is 
viewed as a European institutional crisis: malfunctioning institutions and polit-
ical over-integration of Europe are at the heart of it. Globalisation in the form 
of global markets as well as capital flight and production off-shoring are also 
detected as problems.  
The fourth quadrant is certainly underrepresented, which is also due to the 
lack of material available. This is a result of the low professional and political 
profiles economists located here have – or to their heterodox stances. They see 
problems for the real economy in the form of credit shortage and the tendency 
to postpone investments. In addition, European political integration has become 
a problem because it does not go far enough.  
5.2  Solutions 
The solutions put forward are often linked to the problems detected, but it is a 
variable and dynamic relationship leading to some interesting shifts. It comes 
somewhat as a surprise that the only solution that appears to appeal to almost 
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everyone is OMTs located right at the barycentre, probably because the sheer 
announcement by Mario Draghi does seem to have not only convinced the 
financial markets but also created a broad consensus among the economists 
studied here. Starting from here, it should be kept in mind that the other solu-
tions near the centroid are also closely interlinked to each other, forming a 
common sense in the space. The second axis can be seen as differentiating 
between solutions that are aimed at disciplining individuals and adhere to the 
catchphrase “stick to the rules” at the top, and solutions aimed at governing 
interactions attempting to optimise overall effects at the bottom. The first axis 
distinguishes between solutions that require national sovereignty in order to be 
implemented on the right and those rooted in transnational, often European but 
also international institutions, on the left.  
In the first quadrant, the main thrust of solutions may be termed as nationally 
focused, at times even nationalist. Europe is only mentioned in two instances: 
first, as “EU der Vaterländer,” i.e., as a federation of autonomous and fully 
sovereign units; second, in connection with the European Fiscal Compact and 
six-pack legislation in 2012 and 2011, respectively, although they are close to 
the second quadrant. This makes sense with regard to the other solutions which 
are mostly directed at disciplining southern sinners (Matthijs and McNamara 
2015) and breaking up the euro. Any form of help by the EU for southern 
member states should be stopped; Greece should leave the EMU and reintro-
duce the drachma, at least as a parallel currency. If other member states follow 
suit, this might lead to a northern or core euro. Another option would be for 
Germany to reintroduce the Deutschmark, an idea closely linked to the hope of 
overturning current approaches to the crisis in national elections.  
All these solutions make it possible for southern countries to devaluate their 
currency. This solution is frequently referred to and the EMU cursed for pre-
venting it from being implemented. Increasing the efficiency of tax collection 
and introducing higher corporate and property taxes in southern member states 
go down the same road, as does the idea of capping manager salaries. From 
such a nation-state-centred point of view, states become important investors in 
general and particularly as far as education and infrastructure are concerned. 
Often the German state is mentioned as having restrained itself in recent years 
in this respect, which now justifies a more open stance towards investing. The 
same argument is applied when pointing to a reduction of working hours, a 
lowering of pension entry age, and wage increases. This nation-centred and, at 
times, protectionist view also involves restraining state intervention and adher-
ing to the ideal of a lean state as propagated by classical German ordoliberal-
ism. The only solution mentioned for the banking crisis – a crisis definition not 
strong in this part of the space – seems to follow a similar pattern: let them go 
bankrupt.  
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Graph 4:  Cloud of Modalities in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2, Discursive 
Modalities: Solutions 
 
Just into the second quadrant, solutions envisaged are not introducing the ESM 
and abandoning the ECB’s OMT and related measures. Also close is the call 
for increasing the pension entry age in southern member states. Most of the 
other solutions implied advocate giving considerably more problem-solving 
capacities to the EU and its institutions, albeit taking into account that the EMU 
institutions do need reforming (for instance, reducing the veto power of the 
southern member states). Austerity measures can be found right in the middle, 
close to the slightly weaker idea of budget discipline. In this region of the 
space, the recapitalisation of states as well as banks is seen as a credible solu-
tion. At the same time, it is argued that EU support for southern member states 
has to be linked to the enforcement of reforms and is thus conditional. These 
active interventions also include the call for tax increases and, lower down, a 
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stronger emphasis on European cohesion policy tools such as European Struc-
tural and Investment Funds (ESIF). But the EU is not only seen as a strong 
agent that needs to act in times of EMU crisis, but also at the decisive level of 
regulation setting and monitoring the rules for economic conduct. With regard to 
the individual member states, an EU state insolvency mechanism is called for. 
As far as the banks are concerned, an increase in banking regulation at both 
international and European level is advocated. More specifically, calls for 
higher equity ratios are frequently mentioned, and for more diversity in the 
banking sector, including ideas to separate investment and save banks or more 
specific microprudential forms of regulation – closer to the third quadrant.  
All these measures are aimed at revamping financial markets in order for 
them to be able to function efficiently again, making free capital markets a 
credible solution. Right at the top is financial transaction tax, often seen as an 
adequate strategy for pacifying financial markets without directly intervening. 
Here the ECB’s independence – making it a strong institution – is held in great 
esteem and linked to a call for it to put an end to its loose monetary policy; it 
should stick to the rules. The ECB as a strong institution is also inherent in two 
solutions opposed in meaning and located right at the border of the third quad-
rant: a call for a loose money policy as well as the ESM. These two rather 
adverse currents in this area of the space seem to be often connected by a 
pragmatic neoliberalism that is closely interwoven with the creation of the EU 
and the use of neoliberal policy mechanisms (Bernhard and Münch 2011; 
Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017).  
Just into the third quadrant, states are addressed with reference to bureau-
cratic reforms, their commitment to pay their debts and as initiators of structural 
reforms in general, but the arguments are linked to EU-wide coordination 
working towards one goal. In this area, closer to the autonomous pole of the 
economic space and therefore not so tightly engaged in consulting and actively 
forming policies, solutions are less geared towards feasibility. Eurobonds, a 
European Monetary Fund (EMF), or debt fund, and the need for an international 
state insolvency law are envisioned. Further towards the fourth quadrant, a 
higher degree of European political integration is proposed in the form of 
common European fiscal and financial policies – including EU taxes and a 
finance commissioner in some of the sketches – a common European economic 
policy and a common European social policy – involving a system of European 
unemployment benefits and, in some cases, social benefits. Innovative solutions 
can also be found for the banking crisis calling for mechanisms to increase 
transparency in financial markets and for tools for macroprudential regulation 
and supervision. Monitoring of and intervening in markets if necessary are 
closely connected here. Not only does the solution of increasing and improving 
economic education point towards a high esteem for economic expertise in this 
region of the space but so does the call for more explicit and comprehensive 
communication by the ECB – forward guidance – that is advocated just into the 
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fourth quadrant. Further to the right, two solutions can be found that do not 
really connect to the rest of the discourse and might be labelled heterodox: real 
anticyclical economic policies that include increasing state expenditure and 
therefore debt in times of crisis and a call for pluralism in economic thought 
and policies.  
5.3  Adversaries 
The main adversaries mentioned in the different areas of the space have already 
been insinuated through some of the framings of problems and solutions. The 
national anchorage of the upper right quadrant goes hand in hand with opposition 
to euro-idealists, protectionists, and at times nationalist undertones, which fare 
well with depicting the rich, the political class, the finance industry, the media, 
and elites as the main opponents, thus indirectly addressing other areas of the 
space. Closer to the centroid and so shared by individuals in other quadrants are 
perceptions of left and northern European politicians as standing in the way of 
their own solutions. The attribution of neoliberalism lies just in between the 
first and second quadrant, since it is bound to be used by both sides – and not 
only here – as a pejorative term.  
Politicians from the south seem to be in the way when solutions depicted in 
the upper left quadrant are realised, are Keynesians who most certainly would 
oppose much of the pragmatic neoliberal crisis solutions introduced by EU 
institutions and advocated in this area of space. Seeing economists as adver-
saries marks the opposition between the autonomous and the heteronomous 
pole of the field and is countered in the lower left quadrant by asserting that EU 
politicians and troika experts tend to get in the way of people’s own perception 
of crisis solution. Finally, right-wing politicians and Euro-sceptics are ad-
dressed in the lower left quadrant, thus discursively verifying the oppositions 
visualised in the two dimensional spaces. The empty lower right quadrant is 
probably due to the lack of direct involvement in the discursive struggles. 
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Graph 5:  Cloud of Modalities in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2, Discursive 
Modalities: Adversaries 
 
5.4  Values 
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axis, we find values that can be used to judge individual behaviour whereas 
values at the bottom refer directly to systemic efficiency. In the upper right 
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Marktwirtschaft’ (social market economy) one of the main trademarks of Ger-
man ordoliberalism. This goes hand in hand with the idea of the individual 
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what is to be transferred to the EU level or better dealt with at the level of the 
nation state. The emphasis on the nation state is then supported by drawing on 
differences in national cultures to argue for the basic incompatibility of certain 
policies in Europe. The idea of a balanced budget famously advocated by 
Wolfgang Schäuble as “schwarze Null” (break-even point implied by a level 
budget) is the main reference point for any fiscal decisions here and can be 
seen as one of these differences. Close by are values interwoven with the con-
cept of the nation state, such as democracy, freedom, and private property as 
well as national solidarity which are all frequently employed and positioned 
against European or transnational concepts. The only European yardstick used 
is the norms of EU market integration echoing market citizenship and closely 
linked to notions of competition and competitiveness.  
The inverse is the case for the upper left quadrant where the only national 
reference made is national sovereignty located close to the ordinate axis. This 
area is also characterised by positionings that explicitly state the idea of a free 
market economy (without the suffix social) and by judging market solutions as 
the most efficient forms of producing order in most social contexts. At the 
same time, markets are not seen as perfect machines that only need ‘smart’ 
frameworks to function in; in addition, they need adjusting and resetting from 
time to time (Vogl 2010). The rules laid down in the Treaty of Maastricht can 
be seen as market guaranteeing regulatory framework protecting markets often 
interpellated in positionings that could be labelled pragmatic EU neoliberalism. 
More general values referenced here are justice, wealth, growth, and EU soli-
darity, all resonating with the general idea of the EU being the institutional 
guarantee for prosperity for all in Europe. Central values of monetary policy 
such as the independence of central banks and the stability of the fiscal system 
are to be found lower down, as is European integration when seen as a value in 
and of its own. Located around the centroid, albeit slightly to the left as well as 
downwards, are values commonly agreed on: monetary stability, equality, and 
the moral obligation to repay debt and to assume responsibility for investment 
losses. Lower down and detached from all the rest are the values of economic 
stability and risk reduction which reference neither to the EU, the financial 
market, nor to nation states but to the real economy.  
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Graph 6:  Cloud of Modalities in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2, Discursive 
Modalities: Values 
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structures of hierarchy and differentiation between heteronomy and autonomy 
found in other academic fields (Bourdieu 1988). They intersect with two histor-
ical developments outside of the field but influencing it. The first is the emer-
gence of a European field of bureaucracy (Georgakakis and Rowell 2013) that 
offers not only new objects of research but also new opportunities for econo-
mists to engage with politics and hence access to new sources of academic 
capital. The second is the emergence of a new class of international research 
institutes, some located close to Eurocracy, others beyond it such as scientised 
national central banks, ECB, and above IMF (Mudge and Vauchez 2016), that 
offer new sources of scientific capital to economists and integrate them into 
transnational linkages.  
During the economic crisis that has prevailed since 2009, both developments 
have not declined but picked up momentum, leading to a situation where ever 
more possibilities open up for economists in the transnational realm (Schmidt-
Wellenburg 2017). This contributes to an increase of autonomy from political 
institutions anchored in nation states and to a transnationalisation of the field 
and it creates the two opposing ‘camps’ of economists, one higher in the field 
hierarchy with international linkages, the other lower in the field hierarchy and 
anchored in the nation state, that make the different position-takings intelligible. 
Table 5: Quality Indicators for HAC 
Criteria 3 clusters 4 clusters 5 clusters 6 clusters 7 clusters 
Intra-cluster inertia 1.625 1.516 1.448 1.467 1.425 
Inter-cluster inertia 0.183 0.292 0.360 0.342 0.384 
Explained inertia (%) 10.145 16.163 19.923 18.887 21.220 
Calinski-Harabasz 
(pseudo F) criterion 30.024 34.115 32.957 24.629 23.698 
Davies-Bouldin's 
index 3.422 2.758 2.586 2.928 2.834 
 
These main structures of capital volume, of academic and scientific capital and 
of the degree of transnationalisation also structure the cloud of individuals as 
can be seen in the results of the clustering into 4 groups [see Graph 6]. The 
partitioning is aimed at creating sub-clouds “so that the objects within a same 
cluster are as close together as possible whereas those belonging to different 
clusters are as remote from one another as possible” (Le Roux and Rouanet 
2004, 106). As an ascending method, it works from one-object classes upwards 
and ends with one class that includes all objects, in each step merging two 
classes into one, thus creating a hierarchical tree. The four-group solution of 
the HAC (taken from SPAD 9.0.25) can be seen as fitting best according to 
three criteria [see Table 5]. Firstly, a big loss in inter-cluster inertia by the 
fusion of two clusters is seen as an indicator to use the prior partition. This is 
evident when going from the four to the five cluster solution. In addition, the 
intra-cluster inertia is also fairly high for the chosen solution. Secondly, a high 
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Calinski-Harabasz criterion can be best combined with, thirdly, a low Davies-
Bouldin’s index for the four-cluster solution. Finally, the four-cluster solution 
adds further credibility to the structural and discursive interpretation that has 
been given so far [see Graph 6].  
In their problematizing of the crisis, economists tend to frame what is at 
stake using categories that are in themselves structured by the stakes of a cer-
tain region in the economic field. Consequently, they not only produce state-
ments that make sense in the context of a politico-economic crisis discourse – 
the same statements can and have to be understood in the context of ongoing 
academic struggles, as has been argued here. According to the interpretation 
forwarded here, four different discursive currents can be identified that corre-
spond to four types of economists.  
Graph 7:  Cloud of Individuals in the Plain of Axes 1 and 2, Clustering in 4 
Groups 
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ment and especially ordoliberal and neoliberal think tanks. Here, economists 
with a national mind-set can be found holding linkages to nation state institu-
tions they have built throughout their professional careers and who identify a 
national sovereign debt crisis that should be addressed in a nation-state frame-
work. 
In the top left quadrant, economists are highly engaged with national and in-
ternational government institutions and, at the same time, with national aca-
demic institutions, from where their high amount of academic capital stems. 
Here, economists with a European mind-set identifying a banking crisis and a 
Europe-wide sovereign debt problem that has to be dealt with at European level 
by European institutions are the ones who are more closely linked to trans- and 
international political institutions. 
In the lower left quadrant are located their scientific counterparts who are 
also high in the overall hierarchy, close to sources of scientific reputation and 
autonomy as well as government institutions autonomous from national and 
everyday politics such as the IMF and the ECB. Here, many economists diag-
nose an EU institutional crisis and propose unconventional solutions that are 
less tightly interwoven with highly ‘politicised’ institutions but much more 
with ‘apolitical’ national and transnational state institutions such as central 
banks. 
In the bottom right quadrant, we find those who rank low in today’s internal 
hierarchy of economics, have not published much after their first book, in most 
cases their PhD, do not publish in internationally acclaimed journals and have 
only obtained minor positions in academic institutions or are located at the 
margins of economics proper. The modality of not writing for economic blogs 
and of not having been included with a text in the reconstruction of the dis-
course is located here [see Graph 2]. Economists located here either do not 
have enough symbolic power to voice their perception of crisis issues and/or 
are not interested in engaging as ‘semi-public’ or ‘public intellectuals’ – the 
latter often being in itself an effect of symbolic violence – making this a rather 
silent place in space.  
This brief sketch might also illustrate why there was never a real chance for 
the fundamental economic and political overhaul hoped for by many at the start 
of the crisis – neither with reference to the politico-economic discourse nor to 
the future of the discipline. The high hopes associated with heterodox econom-
ic policies and heterodox economists at the beginning of the crisis were 
grounded by forces of the field. At the same time, it also indicates how the 
crisis was used as an opportunity for incremental changes and consolidating 
one’s position. It seems as if a transnational pragmatism, already strong before 
in either of the discursive realms, has managed to become the new doxa and 
succeeded in marginalising nationally anchored ordoliberalism and its project 
of “Soziale Marktwirtschaft.” 
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Appendix 
Percentages of Modalities of the 20 Active Variables Used, Part 1 
Variable modality % 
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
er
its
 
head of research institute no 96.2 
yes 3.8 
Habilitation habil_no 43.1 
habil 56.9 
scientific awards 
sci_award<=2 23.6 
sci_award>2 14.3 
none 62.1 
country of PhD 
no PhD 5.9 
Austria 3.8 
Germany 74.1 
Italy 2.4 
other EU 3.7 
Switzerland 3.4 
US 6.7 
current academic position 
else 9.9 
JrProf 7.5 
Prof 65.6 
emeritus 17.0 
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
average rank of journal articles 
according to Handelsblatt rankingi 
-- 21.3 
- 17.8 
+ 20.8 
++ 20.3 
avgHBjrank_no 19.8 
main areas of research according 
to JEL classificationsii 
general economics, finance and management 
studies, statistics: jel_GecoMFiStat 28.0 
agriculture and resource economics 6.4 
development, transitional, rural economics 11.3 
history of economics, historical economics, 
system comparison 4.4 
econometrics, macroeconomics, monetary 
studies, international business 21.0 
government and public finance, taxation, 
labour economics 11.4 
microeconomics, game theory, market 
design, industrial organisation 13.4 
no_jel suppl. 
main type of academic 
publishingiii 
chapters in edited volumes 11.3 
edited volumes 13.8 
journal articles: journal 34.0 
monopraphs 25.7 
press publications 12.3 
no publications suppl. 
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Percentages of Modalities of the 20 Active Variables Used, Part 2  
ac
ad
em
ic
 m
em
be
rs
hi
ps
 
German research institutes and 
think tanks 
institutes of the Böckler Stiftung and Keynes 
Gesellschaft 8.2 
CesIfo (Centre for Economic Studies and 
Leibniz Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) 
Munich, IZA (Institute of Labor Economics) 
Bonn, ZEW (Centre for European Economic 
Research) Mannheim
26.9 
CFS (Centre for Financial Studies) Frankfurt, 
HWWI (Hamburgisches 
Weltwirtschaftsinstitut)
5.6 
ordo- and neoliberal institutes such as 
Walter-Eucken Institut Freiburg, Mont Pélerin 
Society, Hayek Gesellschaft, Initiative Neue 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft: GOInst_Neolib
7.7 
IHS (Institute for Advanced Studies) Vienna, 
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung
4.9 
Inst_none 46.7 
non-German research institute or 
think tank 
no 80.3 
nGInst_all 19.7 
current university 
German department ranked as top 25 by 
Handelsblatt: Uni_Hbrank 23.2 
other German department 44.0 
university of apllied sciences: Uni_Gapplsci 8.9 
private university 6.5 
other European university 12.8 
US, UK Australian University: Uni_UsUkAus 4.5 
other German academic 
funding/governance institution 
(e.g. DFG, Wissenschaftsrat) 
no 84.8 
DfgWrat 15.2 
academic governance engagement 
German foundation (e.g. VW or 
Bertelsmann) 
no 92.5 
Gfoundation 7.5 
non-German academic 
funding/governance institutions 
and academies of science 
no 89.7 
nGRcAcad 10.3 
Humboldt-Stiftung and/or DAAD 
(Deutscher Akademischer 
Auslandsdienst) 
no 96.2 
yes 3.8 
re
se
ar
ch
 f
un
di
ng
/c
on
su
lti
ng
 a
nd
 
ea
rn
in
g 
member of council of economic 
advisers 
no 96.6 
Sachverständigenrat 3.4 
type of research funding 
various other German institutions 3.8 
high profile DFG (German Research 
Foundation) 19.2 
EU institutions, Erasmus, business 
foundations 19.8 
non-German institutions all other, national 
banks and banks: fund_nGallBankNzb 9.3 
no_funding 48.0 
consulting or working in business trade and labour associations 2.5 
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banking and investment Banking 12.8 
co-operative banking 3.2 
board member in industrial corporation 7.6 
international management consulting or 
accounting 4.4 
none 62.2 
small consultancy or CEO 7.3 
engagement with and consulting 
of political institutions 
German government institutions on the 
national, regional and local level: GGov_all 21.1 
non-German governments and EU 
institutions: nGGovEU 11.6 
GovConsult_no 48.5 
national central banks, European Central 
Bank, International Monetary Fund: 
GovConsult_NzbEzbImf
14.0 
United Nations, OECD, World Bank and 
development banks 4.7 
political awards none 95.6 
pol_award 4.4 
Percentages of the Modalities of the Passive Variables Used, Part 1 
variable label of modality % 
fu
rt
he
r c
ha
ra
ct
er
isa
tio
n 
year of PhD 
51-65 9.8 
65-74 3.4 
75-84 15.9 
85-94 15.5 
95-04 24.4 
05-13 27.3 
none 3.8 
number of research projects 
no_funding 44.6 
1-2 20.3 
3-6 18.1 
>6 17.0 
number of engagements in political and 
governmental realm (consulting/earning) 
GovConsult_no 45.6 
1 18.9 
2 10.5 
3-5 13.9 
>5 11.1 
po
lit
ic
o-
ec
on
om
ic
 a
nd
 d
isc
ip
lin
ar
y 
st
ru
gg
le
s 
letter for/against EU banking union 
pro 48.4 
contra 48.4 
both 3.2 
ÖkonomenBlog and/or Wirtschaftliche Freiheit or 
VoxEU and/or Ökonomenstimmen 
blog_wifreiök 7.3 
blog_voxEU 21.1 
none 71.7 
SPD spd 2.4 
CDU/CSU cdu 2.6 
FDP fdp 1.6 
AfD afd 3.2 
ALFA alfa 1.2 
Bündniss Bürgerwille bbwill 3.0 
HSR 43 (2018) 3  │  185 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung fes 3.4 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung kas 0.9 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung naumann 2.5 
Real World Economics realw_eco 3.2 
Plurale Ökonomie plural_eco 2.8 
Baut die deutsche Volkswirtschaft nach 
internationalen Standards um change_GEconomics 15.4 
Rettet die Wirtschaftspolitik an den Universitäten keep_wipol 6.3 
Percentages of the Modalities of the Passive Variables Used, Part 2 
te
xt
 Were texts retrievable for coding discursive position-
takings? 
text 67.6 
no_text 32.4 
di
sc
ur
siv
e 
po
sit
io
ni
ng
: p
ro
bl
em
s 
European Monetary Union EMU 23.8 
disintegration of European Monetary Union EMUend 6.5 
no alternative to € €noalt 4.0 
loose monetary policy by ECB ECBliqui+ 14.7 
ECB interest rates too low ECBintrate- 9.3 
outright monetary transactions and direct 
interference in capital markets OMT 14.2 
European debt and transfer union EUdebtransu 7.5 
European stability mechanism ESM 14.6 
conflicts between EU members/institutions EUconflict 4.2 
Eurobonds EUbond 1.4 
state of current EU integration EUpolinteg 4.4 
EU political integration not going far enough EUnopolinteg 3.1 
financial speculation finspec 7.0 
unregulated banking and financial markets breg- 8.6 
too much regulation of banking and finance breg+ 5.1 
link between banks and sovereign debt bstdebtlink 7.8 
corporate governance of banks bgov 7.1 
banks too big to fail/bail out btbtf_bout 7.4 
bank solvency bsolv 13.6 
banking market structure bmarketstruc 9.6 
interbank relations and systemic risk sysrisk 5.4 
state intervention state intervention 10.5 
southern EU members don’t implement reforms noreformsouth 3.8 
southern EU members’ sovereign debt stdebtsouth 18.4 
sovereign debt in general statedebtall 22.5 
southern EU members’ current account deficits accountbalancesouth 4.0 
account imbalances in general/northern surplus accountbalancenorth 7.4 
southern EU members’ fiscal policy fipolsouth 9.9 
national fiscal policy in general fispolnat 12.9 
austerity policies auster 9.4 
structural problems in general strucprobl 6.5 
culturally induced laziness cultural lazyness 2.1 
media coverage of crisis media 2.9 
taxpayer and citizens loss of wealth wealthloss 13.3 
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selfishness of politicians polself 11.7 
precarious social conditions precarious 13.1 
inequality and social unrest inequal 9.8 
economic downturn downturn 13.2 
southern members’ competitiveness competsouth 9.2 
missing economic expertise noexpert 5.4 
globalisation, off-shoring, capital flight globalization 7.7 
investments in real economy invest- 9.0 
EMU reduced to core €/parallel currency €core 3.1 
ECB reduce liquidity ECBliqui- 3.0 
ECB increase liquidity ECBliqui+ 6.1 
ECB non-political and autonomous ECBnopol 2.5 
OMT (e.g. direct engagement state securities) OMTyes 7.2 
OMT are not option OMTno 1.9 
EMU insitutions reform EMUref 9.1 
ECB communication/forward guidance ECBcom 3.1 
EU Vaterländer EUVaterländer 3.1 
end to EU aid for members in crisis EUstophelp 1.5 
EU Fiscal and Stability Pact/Six-Pack EUfispac 8.7 
EU aid only if southern members comply EUhelpcon 6.5 
ESM ESMyes 8.3 
ESM abandon ESMno 5.3 
EU state insolvency mechanism EUstinsollaw 2.9 
EU cohesion policies EUcohpol 3.5 
bail out banks and states bout 3.1 
open and deregulate (financial)markets freecapm 2.5 
EU institutions better coordination EUcoord 5.1 
Eurobonds EUbond 5.2 
EU integration fiscal, social, economic policy EUfespol 8.3 
EU monetary or debt fund EMF 3.9 
bank insolvency binsol 10.5 
salary caps for management salerycap 2.0 
financial transaction tax ftt 3.0 
bank bail-in by owners and shareholders bailinpriv 8.2 
bank recapitalisation brecap 5.7 
international financial regulation increase intfreg+ 4.3 
banking regulation increase breg+ 20.1 
microprudential regulation increase micprud+ 7.1 
macroprudential regulation increase macprud+ 3.2 
banks’ equity ratios increase bequi+ 12.2 
banking market diversification bdivers 4.2 
banking transparency increase btransp+ 4.5 
tax efficiency increase taxeff 3.5 
tax raises especially southern members tax+ 5.4 
tax property higher southern members taxprop 2.1 
EMU southern members leave drachma 11.1 
deutschmark DM 3.5 
national currency devaluation currdeval 6.5 
democratic voting for change vote 2.3 
state investments general increase stinvest 5.7 
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state investments infrastructure increase infrainvest 8.0 
state investments education increase eduinvest 3.1 
35h/week, retirement age down, wages up 35/60/wage+ 3.2 
retirement age increase rentage+ 1.8 
lean state, labour reform, debt cap leanst 16.2 
state recapitalisation strecap 17.7 
austerity hard auster 14.6 
budgetary discipline budgetdis 9.9 
structural reforms in general strucref 12.4 
debt repayment and reduction paydebt 7.1 
bureaucracy reform bureauref 2.3 
international state insolvency law stinsollaw 2.9 
anticyclical policies (Keynesianism) anticycl 4.5 
economic education increase econedu 1.9 
economics disciplinary pluralism pluraleco 1.7 
politicians southern EU members polsouth 7.0 
politicians northern EU members polnorth 5.3 
EU politicians EUpol 10.4 
politicians right-wing right 1.5 
politicians left-wing left 3.2 
political class derogatory polclass 10.3 
experts Troika, IMF, World Bank troika_expert 1.3 
Euro-idealists €idealist 3.2 
Euro-sceptics €sceptic 2.5 
Keynesian keynesian 2.3 
neoliberal neoliberal 3.4 
economist economist 1.8 
financial industry fiind 6.8 
media media 2.6 
rich elites richelite 3.4 
liberal free market economy freemecon 6.3 
social market economy socmecon 1.6 
EU as civilizational accomplishment EUidea 7.4 
EU further integration EUinteg 5.2 
EU solidarity EUsoli 6.0 
EMU Maastricht Treaty/Stability and Growth Pact Maastricht 3.0 
EU market liberalization and creation EUmarket 5.2 
national culture natculture 5.7 
national solidarity natsolidarity 2.2 
subsidiarity subsi 5.1 
central bank independence cbindepen 10.4 
monetary stability monstabil 9.4 
market ideal information-allocation-device marketabsol 2.6 
market incomplete marketincompl 3.6 
competition compet 12.2 
financial market stability fistabil 8.8 
risk reduction riskred 2.3 
responsibility for investments/debt debthonour 11.7 
balanced budget (Schwarze Null) schwNull 3.1 
economic stability econstabil 4.5 
private property privprop 2.4 
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wealth wealth 7.9 
growth growth 15.5 
equality equality 3.6 
freedom freedom 3.3 
justice justice 5.5 
democracy democ 9.7 
 
                                                          
i  Average calculated using the Handelsblatt-Ranking for journals of 2011 (<htmldb-
hosting.net/pls/htmldb/FMONITORING.download_my_file?p_file=721> based on Combes 
and Linnemer 2010), split into quartiles of highest to lowest and supplemented by a fifth 
category for those not publishing in ranked journals. 
ii  357 economists published articles using the classification of the Journal of Economic Litera-
ture (JEL). The data was collected from <https://ideas.repec.org/j/index.html>, reduced to 
the main 53 categories in use and each one of the economists was assigned the five catego-
ries he or she used the most as characteristic economical areas in which he or she practises 
economics. The 123 who did not use JELC were then classified by their research interests 
named in the CVs and the denomination of their chairs. Using HAC based on an MCA of the 
53 JEL properties of all 480 individuals, eight groups were created and each economist as-
signed to one of these as his or her main area of research. 
iii  Information for each economist on publications in each of these categories was collected 
from CVs, publication lists, the German national library and econbiz.de, counted and divided 
by the number of all economists’ publications in the same category to arrive at the single 
economist’s contribution to the category. The category in which he fared best was assigned. 
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